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Silence as the greatest music: 
The harmony of philosophy 
and Mousikê in Plato’s Phaedo
Goetz Richter
Plato’s Phaedo has always attracted special attention not least because 
of its challenging topic: the meditation on death and the portrayal of 
dying. In thinking about this particular convergence of reﬂection and 
reality important philosophical questions emerge. How can we conceive 
death? What can we say about dying? Why are we thinking about death 
and dying? 
It seems that a coherent approach to death and dying is equally 
problematic in reﬂection and reality. The common attitude is one of 
silence. We ignore the reﬂection and accept the reality when it happens. 
But the suggestion in the Phaedo is that we must practice in reﬂection 
what we are to live in reality. Socrates in fact goes further by asserting 
death as the central topic of philosophy. He states that “those who practice 
philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead” (Phaedo, 
64a, trans. Fowler). This suggests that the contemplation of death in the 
Phaedo mirrors the examined life in the Apology.1 Its silent maxim may 
be that the unpractised death is not worth dying. The striking portrayal 
of Socrates’ death2 shows that an examination or practice of death is not 
only possible but that such an examination will transform our attitude 
towards dying. This transformation is underlined dramatically: the 
dialogue commences with its main character imprisoned. It ends with this 
character admonishing a disciple to pay a debt for a process of recovery, 
of healing and of liberation. 
But what is it exactly in the Phaedo that enables this transformation, 
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given that the arguments for immortality designed to appease any fears 
and uncertainties about death remain ultimately unsatisfactory?3 What 
enables a comprehensive, realistic practice of death and dying speciﬁcally? 
Does the Phaedo make a case for a particular mode of thinking? I will try to 
show that the Phaedo achieves its practice and transformation because it is 
not just a work of philosophy but also and importantly a work of mousikê. 
This must strike us as a startling claim: music as we know it would require 
sounds. However, the Phaedo remains silent. In addition silence plays a 
signiﬁcant part in the dialogue. Is this a problem for our claim that it is 
a work of music? Perhaps not, for most musical works contain silence 
and at least one notorious piece of music, John Cage’s 4’33”, is a work 
of complete silence. If the Phaedo is to be a work of music or mousikê we 
will need to clarify the importance of silence in it. But before I turn to this 
important question, I must outline in which way the dialogue suggests a 
view of itself as mousikê. I intend to do this in three sections: I will ﬁrstly 
consider the question if and how Socrates is a musician. I will then consider 
two musical phenomena in the dialogue and discuss their philosophical 
relevance. After this discussion I turn to the question in which sense silence 
in the Phaedo can nonetheless be conceived as music. 
I. Socrates as a musician: Nietzsche’s music-making Socrates
There are three clear references in the Phaedo that portray Socrates 
as a musician in some sense: the ﬁrst occurs when Socrates answers the 
suggestion from Cebes that he has been engaged in the composition of 
mousikê (60d).  The second, brief reference alludes to Socrates as a singer 
who charms away the fear of the hobgoblin of death (77e). And the third 
(85a) draws an analogy between Socrates and the swans, their consecration 
to Apollo, their prophetic abilities and their characteristic song which 
becomes its most beautiful immediately before their death. 
The reference to Socrates’ music making at the beginning of the 
dialogue is based on an account of a dream. When asked if reports of his 
music making are true, Socrates responds:
“The same dream came to me often in my past, sometimes in one form and 
sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: ‘Socrates’, it said, 
‘make music and work at it.’ And I formerly thought it was urging and 
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encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people 
encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do 
what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the 
greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial 
and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case 
the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily 
called music, I ought to do so and not disobey.” (61a)
Socrates’ interpretation of the dream makes a crucial distinction 
between two types of mousikê: mousikê as that which he is always doing, 
that is mousikê as philosophy, and mousikê as “that which is ordinarily 
called music” or demotic music.4 Socrates’ interpretation of the dream 
suggests to him a demand to start practicing demotic mousikê in addition 
to philosophy. 
Nietzsche has interpreted this last-minute turn to music as an important 
step signalling Socrates’ understanding of a limit to a philosophy of 
reason, logic and justiﬁcation. In the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche famously 
pitches the “despotic logician Socrates”, this “eye of the great Cyclops”5 
against an authentic conception of music rooted in Dionysian inspiration. 
Through a culture-historical analysis of the development of classical 
Greek tragedy, Nietzsche argues that a Socratic inﬂuence on Euripidean 
tragedy is responsible for a decline of an originally inspired and intuitive 
artform represented by Aescylos. The essential characteristic of Aescylos’ 
tragedy is the Dionysian—a force that afﬁrms primordial oneness and is 
uncovered in artistic intuition and inspiration. Socratism confronts the 
Dionysian through its rational and critical attitude and through a demand 
for complete and comprehensive justiﬁcation. According to Nietzsche 
Socrates shines the light of full consciousness into all areas of life and only 
allows intuition or instinctive knowledge to serve as a warning signal or 
negation. This rejection of the positive, constitutive powers of intuition 
and inspiration expels the spirit of music from the classical tragedy. It is 
responsible for a decline of its artistic truth:
The optimistic dialectic drives with the whip of its syllogisms music from 
tragedy: that is, it destroys the essence of tragedy, which must only be 
interpreted as a manifestation and concretisation of Dionysian states, 
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as a visible symbolisation of music, as an imaginary world of Dionysian 
intoxication.6
According to Nietzsche it is however remarkable that the Socratic 
tendency encounters limitations in the conception of the music-making 
Socrates as described in the Phaedo. Initially, Nietzsche interprets Socrates’ 
engagement with mousikê in accordance with his interpretation of the 
frequent references to the daimon. These suggest that Socrates experiences 
“a feeling of lack, an emptiness, a half-hearted accusation, a possibly 
unheeded duty” in the face of art and music. The experienced lack, a 
negative experience of “not understanding” signals that there are limits 
to his logical nature and that life cannot be comprehensively questioned 
and understood:
perhaps—he had to ask himself—is that which I cannot understand also 
not immediately the inconceivable? Perhaps there is a realm of art, of 
wisdom, from which the logician is banned? Perhaps art is even a necessary 
correlation and supplement of science?7
The doubt about the comprehensive powers of rational understanding 
and a consciousness of its limitations in understanding and explaining 
the world and the human being, show the character of a music-making 
Socrates in a renewed light. Despite the initially dialectic conception which 
opposes the Dionysian characteristics of music, tragedy and art to the 
conscious and critical forces of Socratism, Nietzsche’s conception of the 
“music-making Socrates” now becomes a symbol for a transcendence of 
this division. The music-making Socrates is transformed into an ideal in a 
quest for the uniﬁcation of knowledge and instinct, intuition and reﬂection. 
The rebirth of tragedy, which follows the realisation of a decline of art as 
a result of theoretical Socratism, is facilitated by a music-making Socrates 
who closes the gap between a theoretical and a tragic conception of the 
world. Nietzsche’s conception of Socrates thus acquires a dual signiﬁcance 
reaching beyond a simple and negative identiﬁcation of the latter with 
the forces of intellectualism to constitute a symbol of rebirth. Socrates, the 
gadﬂy undermines the truth of the tragedy, but Socrates, the musician, 
leads to its rebirth. Nietzsche writes in the Birth of Tragedy that:
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only after the spirit of science is lead to its limits and its demand for 
universality is destroyed, we can hope for a rebirth of tragedy: for which 
artform we would need to posit the symbol of the music-making Socrates, in 
the previously suggested manner.8
Nietzsche’s culture-historical analysis of tragedy aside, the point seems 
worth noting that the music-making Socrates signals a turn towards a 
particular synthetic understanding which transcends mere propositional 
knowledge. This is further underlined if we recall that the original passage 
in question has Socrates refer to “philosophy as the greatest music”. While 
Socrates understands his dream to suggest a pursuit of demotic music, 
the revelation that he considered himself to be a musician always already 
may push his philosophy into a new light. As a philosopher-musician 
Socrates may indeed transcend ordinary boundaries of knowledge and 
understanding and achieve a uniﬁcation of reﬂection and intuition of the 
kind Nietzsche identiﬁes.  
II. The singer of charms
The Phaedo contains a further reference to Socrates as a musician, 
or more precisely as a singer of charms. This notion of a seductive 
musician whose music transforms the listeners has its origins in an 
orphic conception of music. According to mythology, Orpheus, the son 
of the muse Kalliope, was an extraordinarily charismatic musician. His 
singing and performance on the kithara was reputed to have moved, 
people, animals and plants and even melted stones. Within the fate of 
Orpheus we ﬁnd a tension between the forces of Apollo and Dionysos. 
Traditionally and on account of his association with the kithara, Orpheus 
is initially associated with Apollo, however by virtue of his intoxicating 
and ravishing music making he ultimately is a disciple of Dionysos, 
the God of intoxication and rapture. Mythology reports that Dionysos 
resented the imbalance in Orpheus’ dedication to Apollo and stirred the 
maenads against him. These raving followers, intoxicated and orgiastically 
transported, dismembered Orpheus’ body which ﬂoated to the island of 
Lesbos with his head still singing.
The Dionysian or orphic forces of music are similarly manifested in the 
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myth of the sirens, who lured sailors to their death with their seductive 
songs and in the ﬁgure of the satyr Marsyas. According to mythology,  the 
Aulos-playing Marsyas was challenged to a musical contest by Apollo 
(who played the kithara). According to some interpretations, the muses 
declared Apollo the winner of this contest and Apollo ﬂayed the luckless 
Marsyas as punishment. 
A Dionysian, satyr-like quality is attributed to Socrates in the Symposium, 
which is rich in important allusions to music. Here the intoxicated 
Alcibiades compares Socrates to the musician and satyr Marsyas:
Are you not a piper? Why, yes, and a far more marvellous one than 
the satyr. His lips indeed had power to entrance mankind by means of 
instruments; a thing still possible today for anyone who can pipe his tunes: 
for the music of Olympus’s ﬂute belonged, I may tell you, to Marsyas 
his teacher. So that if anyone, whether a ﬁne ﬂute player or paltry ﬂute-
girl, can ﬂute his tunes, they have no equal for exciting a ravishment and 
will indicate by the divinity that is in them who are apt recipients of the 
deities and their satisfactions. You differ from him in one point only—that 
you produce the same effect with simple prose unaided by instruments. 
(Symposium, 215c)
While Alcibiades vividly describes the erotic attraction which emanates 
from Socrates’ musical characteristics (“For when I hear him I am worse 
than any wild fanatic”, 215e) he also draws our attention to the fact that 
Socrates himself seems entirely sober while inducing intoxication in 
others—a phenomenon that increases the attraction but also ﬁlls Alcibiades 
with some despair or even resentment and suggests that while Dionysian, 
Socrates remains nevertheless in command of the forces in question. 
Unlike the rhapsode whose music making requires that “he has been 
inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him” (Ion, 
534b) Socrates is described by Alcibiades as an ambivalent musician and 
being—as a real satyr. His music leads to the inspiration, even frenzy of 
others but it does not absorb his entire being and leaves himself free to 
contemplate the limits his own “possession” (katechetai). 
The ability to charm away the hobgoblin of death alluded to in the 
Phaedo (77e) is based on this erotic force of music and on musical experience 
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in the context of ambivalence. Cebes initially asks Socrates in a light-
hearted manner to “persuade (peithein)” the imaginary inner child not to 
fear death. Persuasion (peithein) would suggest the need for an argument 
and interpreters have frequently suggested an allegorical interpretation in 
which arguments are to function as such charms9. However, interestingly 
Socrates answers with an exclamation suggesting a rhetorical emphasis. 
His answer suggests that it is not a question of attempting to persuade 
by fair argument but by “singing charms (epodes)” to this child every 
day. While Plato recognises that the argument for the immortality fails, 
this does not necessarily suggest that this will increase our fears. We 
will wish to replace, naturally, the argument with a better one testing 
the convictions that our understanding conceals further, however, the 
certainty which is required to put to rest any fears of death is a certainty 
arising from the activity of philosophy itself—not from any particular 
argument. Socrates refers to singing charms every day—no one charm 
will do. The practice of philosophy as a practice of dying and being dead, 
the daily exposure to philosophy as the greatest music and the music 
resulting from the engagement with daily philosophical argument will 
transform our existence from a child with fears of the hobgoblin of death 
to a philosophical person with Socratic capacities and characteristics who 
is able to face death. This achievement and not the attainment of a certain 
argument for the immortality of the soul is for Socrates the greatest need 
which should be obtained without sparing money or toil10.  The songs 
alluded to here then are the silent, yet musical transformations resulting 
from consistent philosophical engagement. 
III. Socrates’ Swan Song
The third reference in the Phaedo to Socrates as a musician is 
metaphorical. Socrates explores analogies between himself and the swans, 
the birds of Apollo. Swans are renowned for their song immediately 
before their death. A swan song is a ﬁnal and most signiﬁcant musical 
performance. It occurs in the face of death but—as Socrates explains—
contrary to common views swans do not sing out of grief but out of joy. 
In fact swans
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sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most 
and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they 
are…I do not believe they sing for grief… but since they are Apollo’s birds 
I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of 
the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than 
ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans, and 
am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of 
prophecy no whit inferior to theirs … . (85a-b)
This seems a fairly clear statement. Socrates claims to be a disciple of 
Apollo and to possess prophetic gifts like the swans. By implication, we 
can assume that he also believes that his “song” is at its most beautiful 
as a result of his conﬁdence and joy in being reunited with Apollo. The 
latter point is the most important one, perhaps. The reference to the 
swans and their songs follows a signiﬁcant and long silence (84c) from 
Socrates, the expression of discomfort by Simmias and Cebes about the 
earlier arguments on the immortality of the soul (84d) and a reference to 
Socrates’ “misfortune” (84e). Socrates’ point of referring to himself in an 
analogy to the swans seems clear: no matter what the fate of the actual 
argument on immortality may be he is not unfortunate. The activity of 
philosophy, its ability to purify the philosopher and the life of philosophy 
are a sufﬁcient grounding for cheerfulness and joy in the face of death. 
The swan-song indicates that it is not necessary to achieve propositional 
certainties about death or dying. What matters is the practice beforehand, 
the life that preceded the death. The swans, “who sing at other times 
also” (84e) merely express and celebrate a certainty and understanding 
they have always had. 
Socrates’ swan-song expresses the same. Socrates too has always 
maintained that the philosopher “practices dying and being dead”. This 
practice has generated a conﬁdence and even joy about the detachment 
of the soul from the body which is the reality of philosophy and a feature 
of death. While Socrates’ swan-song shows further arguments about the 
immortality of the soul in a new light, their propositional content appears 
only of secondary relevance. As they are developed in the dialogue they 
are not even particularly strong arguments and they will not contribute 
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certainty or provide further guarantees for immortality in any case11. To 
demand such an outcome would be ignoring Socrates’ point that:
he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of 
each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it. 
(65e)  
In addition we would ignore the frequent reminder that “true virtue 
exists only with wisdom” (69b), that is, that a truthful life remains 
independent of rewards and punishments, of fears of pain or desire for 
pleasure. It is lead with a view of exposing itself to principles of reason 
alone while arguments do not directly relieve its existence. They serve 
to develop the condition of the person as they examine conditions and 
convictions. In fact, the condition of an argument becomes an occasion 
to practice and develop the condition of the person. The former is a 
challenge, perhaps an instrument that develops the latter and assists the 
philosopher in his puriﬁcation and in his practice of dying. The pursuit 
of argument is a journey on a raft in which we “sail through life in the 
midst of dangers” (85d) in the absence of a stronger vessel. The main 
concern is the condition of the person making this voyage. This seems 
the central point of Socrates’ argument against misologia which makes 
the point that a “hatred of argument” arises from a mistaken view that 
the failure of arguments is to blame for the lack of “truth and knowledge 
of reality” rather than the fact that “we ourselves are not yet in a sound 
condition” (90d).
When the condition of the person considering any arguments becomes 
the focal point of our interest, any portrayal of this condition must turn 
thus to a mode of expression that can reﬂect this altered subject matter 
or focus. Spiritual conditions are best expressed by music, it seems, and 
hence the reference to Socrates, the musician and singer. The Phaedo 
stresses on a number of occasions Socrates’ condition especially so after 
the long silence at Phaedo 84c: Initially Socrates experiences a “mixture of 
pleasure and pain” (60d), however, following the silence and the reference 
to the swans and their song, descriptions of Socrates’ condition become 
more frequent. He looks keenly and smiles (86d). While the companions 
are “uncomfortable” (88c) Socrates addresses them in a “pleasant, gentle 
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and respectful manner” (89a) which draws much admiration from 
Phaedo himself. The discomfort of some of the friends makes room for 
light—heartedness in the course of the discussion (“Cebes laughed” 
101b) and when ﬁnally the moment comes to drink the poison,  Socrates 
behaves unlike some who become angry and curse the person serving 
the poison (116c) and instead drinks the poison “very cheerfully and 
quietly” (117c).
The portrayal of Socrates’ death is then an excellent example of a central 
demand of Socratic philosophy: the requirement that deeds and words of 
the philosopher must be in harmony. It is this harmony that Plato identiﬁes 
in the Laches (interestingly also in the context of identifying misologia or 
hatred of argument) as the characteristic of a true musician:
For you might think me a lover, and yet also a hater, of discussions: for 
when I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, one who is 
truly a man and worthy of his argument, I am exceedingly delighted; I 
take the speaker and his speech together, and observe how they sort and 
harmonise with each other. Such a man is exactly what I understand by 
“musical”– he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre 
or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord (symphônon) 
of his own life between his words and his deeds. (Laches, 188d)
The musician becomes a metaphor for a person in a “sound condition”. 
According to Laches’ view, then, there is a need for anyone engaged in 
arguments (logoi) to become a musician so that such logoi are based on 
a concord of words and deeds. This is the same argument that Socrates 
advances in the Phaedo. Socrates himself would need to be described as a 
person of such concord and as a musician in this sense. Furthermore, the 
Phaedo is designed to show this musicality of Socrates in a most difﬁcult 
circumstance: his own death. Just like a complex work of music challenges 
the musician in his talent and skill, Socrates’ death presents a formidable 
challenge to the music-making Socrates.
The interplay between the condition of the person and her philosophical 
arguments is a signiﬁcant feature of the Phaedo. These two dimensions are 
woven together skilfully with argument, mythical, poetic and allegorical 
description and commentary creating a polyphonic composition.12. The 
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feature of this multidimensional structure, which like a work of music 
comes to presence in the temporal unfolding of the reader’s imagination 
and reﬂection, is that propositional articulation forms only a part of 
the meaning of this dialogue. A large part appears to be constituted by 
rhetorical—or better—musical phenomena which throw direct light on 
the complex subject matter in question.
IV. Mousikê and philosophy as the greatest music
The discussion of Socrates as a musician has suggested that a music 
making Socrates transcends the common view of him as a purely 
rational thinker engaged in challenging argument. It will also allow us to 
contextualise the value of argument further. The view that the musician 
primordially seeks to establish a harmony between his words and his 
deeds is reﬂected by the fact that Socrates’ philosophical questioning 
is always also directed towards examining his own existence and that 
of his interlocutors with a view of forming his and their philosophical 
constitution. In relation to the ﬁnitude of this existence, however, such 
questioning faces a particular challenge. No argument for the immortality 
of the soul achieves compelling certainty. Yet, given the seriousness and 
urgency of the issue in the Phaedo such certainty appears required. What 
then guides the conﬁdence and even cheerfulness of the dying philosopher 
Socrates in the face of his own death? I have suggested above that it is 
his consistent practice of philosophy as the greatest music. With the 
practice of philosophy as music, the existence of the philosopher becomes 
transformed through an experience that transcends the simply rational. In 
the following I wish to discuss this view of philosophy as music further 
from three angles: through a consideration of mousikê itself, through two 
important musical phenomena in the Phaedo (harmonia and symphônein) 
and through a consideration of silence in the Phaedo that may provide 
us with an essentially musical meaning of silence in this philosophical 
dialogue.
Before we can conﬁdently discuss Socrates’ statement of “philosophy 
as the greatest music” further, we need to pose the question what mousikê 
actually means in this context? The Greek term mousikê can include three 
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different levels of meaning: it can refer to a form of sound, to an artistic 
practice and to the art of the muses as a whole. Most of the information 
about these various aspects of mousikê is derived from indirect descriptions 
and variously through vase illustrations, through mythology, through 
music-theoretical treatises or through the writings of the philosophers. As 
a form of sound mousikê refers to purely instrumental music, however, in 
Greek musical culture that was a fairly rare and only emerging practice and 
one which did meet signiﬁcant criticism on account of its imitative nature. 
It is important to note in this context that Greek music was homophonic, 
that is, its instruments played in a unison rhythm and/or melody. This 
also means that harmony was largely a melodic concept referring to 
intervals and the proportion of pitches played in succession rather than 
simultaneously. Mousikê as purely instrumental music and sound attracted 
the criticism of Plato as evidenced by the disqualiﬁcation of the ﬂute girls 
in the Symposium or by the identiﬁcation of its imitative characters and 
modes in the third book of the Republic. 
Secondly, though, mousikê refers to a holistic, artistic practice 
encompassing dance, recitation and song. This was referred to as melos—
perfect melos if it encompassed song, dance and recitation. The clarity of 
language and the way in which music was able to support the text was 
evidently of utmost importance. Much of Greek musical theory is dedicated 
to establishing which modes of music and which rhythmic emphasis is 
best able to reﬂect the meaning of text and preserves a sense of rational 
pathos or sobriety. In that sense mousikê was also part of the Greek tragedy. 
Such practice was still dependent on imitative characteristics of music, 
however, with a capacity to imitate good character and a good disposition, 
the value of mousikê particularly to education would improve in Plato’s 
view and achieve even an important status. According to Socrates:
education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else 
rhythm and harmony ﬁnd their way to the inmost soul and take strongest 
hold upon bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained 
and otherwise the contrary. (Republic 401d). 
This makes it important to identify from the outset the ethical value 
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of speciﬁc characteristics of music. Imitation which leads to confusion, an 
artiﬁcial increase in sensuous excitement or a destruction of temperance 
must be rejected. Rhythm which reﬂects orderliness must be promoted 
and one must not “pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic 
movements, but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is 
orderly and brave.” (Republic 300e). It is the connection between speech 
and rhythm that is crucial here for a mousikê that is in Plato’s view at all 
times a servant of logos: 
Good speech, then, good accord and good grace and good rhythm wait upon 
a good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically 
style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the 
character and the mind. (Republic 400e) 
Musical modes reﬂect character and are similarly identiﬁed as harmful 
or beneﬁcial to character or habit (êthos). There are some that reﬂect 
drunkenness or laxness (Lydian and Ionian modes) and others that are 
even “useless to women” such as the Lydian mode (Republic 398e). Modes 
that:
ﬁttingly imitate the utterances and the accents of the brave man who is 
engaged in warfare or in any enforced business and who, when he has failed 
either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in 
all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels 
her strokes (Republic 399b) 
are to be welcomed in the education of the young.  
Imitation – according to Plato – removes us from truth. If a poet 
imitates a character instead of narrating the story himself, this becomes 
questionable particularly if the ethos that is reﬂected is bad and should be 
rejected. Imitation, if condoned at all, is only acceptable if it is of worthy 
content and truthful behaviour. If the guardians of goodness in a society 
are to imitate anything, they: 
should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them—men, that 
is, who are brave, sober, pius, free and all things of that kind; but things 
unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, 
nor yet any other shameful thing. Lest from the imitation they imbibe the 
reality. Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth 
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far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature in the body, the 
speech, and the thought. (Republic 395c)
The third level of meaning refers to mousikê as the entire realm of the 
arts of the muses. This includes culture and education. Mousikê in this 
sense complements gymnastics and forms the soul whereas gymnastics 
form the body. A person who is “a-mousikos” is primarily uncultured 
and uneducated—not only unskilled in music or unmusical in an artistic 
sense. In fact, mousikê in this wider sense is not an art but an entire human 
disposition or character. Someone excessively exposed and educated in 
mousikê would have a “soft soul” whereas someone excessively exposed 
and trained in gymnastics would be uncouth, rough and insensitive. In 
this wider sense mousikê refers to the balance between cognitive, emotional, 
ethical, personal and cultural attributes of our existence and character. 
As the art of the muses, mousikê embraces a number of human 
intellectual and spiritual endeavours: poetry, comedy, music in the narrow 
sense, recitation, dance, philosophy, astronomy and history. According to 
mythology, the nine muses, daughters of Zeus and Mnêmosynê, personify 
these different endeavours and are variously able to inspire and transform 
the human consciousness into rapture or enthousiasmos for these activities. 
This inspiration is not itself a guarantee of truth, though, for the muses 
appear to be ambiguous beings as Hesiod indicates in his Theogony:
The Muses once taught Hesiod to sing, sweet songs, while he was 
shepherding his lambs on holy Helicon; the goddesses Olympian, daughters 
of Zeus who holds the aegis, ﬁrst addressed these words to me: ‘you rustic 
shepherds, shame: bellies you are, not men! We know enough to make up 
lies which are convincing, but we also have the skill, when we’ve a mind, to 
speak the truth.13
The possibilities of the muses to speak the truth or alternatively “make 
up lies which are convincing” indicates a danger and opportunity for 
philosophy. Not all divine inspiration that stems from the muses, it seems, 
can be taken as truth. The philosopher must subject any enthousiasmos 
to reﬂection and investigate whether such inspiration is of genuine 
value to truth or whether it is in fact misleading. The possibility that an 
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inspired conviction is mistaken for truth ﬁnds a most eloquent reﬂection 
in Nietzsche’s warning that “convictions are more dangerous enemies to 
truth than lies.”14 
V. Musical connection in the Phaedo: harmonia and symphônein
Two musical phenomena achieve elevated signiﬁcance in the Phaedo: 
harmonia and symphônein. Both describe forms of connection, although 
the latter refers to an activity of relating and the former to a mode of 
connection. Socrates discusses harmonia in the context of the possibility 
that it describes the mode of existence of the soul. Simmias had advanced 
the hypothetical argument that if the soul was harmonia, it would perish 
with the disappearance of the physical elements that constitute it akin to 
the harmony produced by the lyre and its strings. If the latter perish, any 
resulting musical harmony perishes with them. Since the soul is assumed 
to be a harmonia, it could be similarly argued that it will perish when the 
body perishes. Socrates addresses Simmias’ argument from three aspects: 
he ﬁrstly reminds him that since all learning is recollection (a view that 
is emphatically shared by Simmias) the soul must in fact pre-exist. A pre-
existence implies immortality (a questionable point, incidentally). He 
secondly uses the notion of harmony as a compound to argue that  the 
soul, however, cannot be a compound if it indeed pre-exists:
You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your 
opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony 
made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body…For 
harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the 
strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the 
harmony is the last of all to be composed and the ﬁrst to perish. (92b)
And ﬁnally, Socrates argues that the soul cannot be a harmony made 
up of any elements. If the soul was a harmony, the possibility of a greater 
harmony would imply the possibility of a soul that was “more completely 
and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a 
less extent” (93b).
With all three arguments  Socrates tries to defend the view that the 
soul is independent from the body and can rule the body but not vice 
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versa. Ultimately, Simmias’ suggestion that the soul was a harmonia or 
a compound of physical constitution is shown to have consequences 
that contradict Socrates’ entire approach to philosophy and naturally 
the central concern of the Phaedo. Simmias ﬁnds himself in a position in 
which his metaphorical conception of the soul as harmonia does not appear 
to harmonise with arguments or experiences that have been identiﬁed 
through a “sound course of argument” (92d) already. 
The central concern of the Phaedo is to show the possibility of a 
separation between the body and the soul: in the work and life of the 
philosopher this separation is consistently practiced and in dying and 
death it is realised. Such a separation is in fact experienced as a form of 
liberation. However, if the soul perishes in this separation, the project of 
philosophy is meaningless, the philosopher is identiﬁed as idle and there 
is no need to engage in philosophy. Given this self-contradiction, then, 
the soul can thus not be a harmony (95a). 
This last argument is somewhat peculiar. Is it not entirely circular? 
What if the notion of anamnesis on which the entire refutation of the 
harmonia assumption hinges is rejected? In addition why should the 
pre-existence of the soul require its post-existence or immortality? These 
points are arguments that could challenge Socrates’ refutation, however, 
they ignore the central point of the discussion, namely, the activity of 
philosophy itself. 
If the soul is a harmonia in the sense outlined by Simmias, that is a 
“blend or composition of contraries”15 with such contraries conceived to 
be dependent on the body, then a separation between body and soul is not 
possible without mutual destruction. In the activity of philosophy however, 
it is clearly shown by Socrates that such a separation is not only intended 
but achievable. This showing is a musical showing, as I have outlined 
above—a substantiation by virtue of a performance. A dimension of this 
performance is reﬂected in the theory of anamnêsis. The understanding 
is further completed by the entirety of the dialogue itself and by the way 
in which Socrates “makes music” and claims for himself a congruence 
between word and deed, a musical existence. It is this congruence and 
the performative conception of philosophy which allow Socrates to invert 
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the argument: the performance of philosophy as a practice of death and 
dying transforms itself into a proof for the immortality of the soul. Like a 
work of music, which validates its musical material and themes through 
its entire unfolding and does not construct an argument with only one 
outcome, the hidden inversion is musically sustained. 
The rejection of the soul as a harmonia does not preclude that the body 
and soul cannot constitute themselves a harmonia. In fact, such a possibility 
would become clearer within a more abstract view of harmonia outlined by 
Erixymachus in the Symposium which identiﬁes harmonia as consonance 
(symphônia) and consonance as a kind of agreement (homologia).16 However 
in this context (and in the well-known discussion of harmoniai in the 
Republic17) harmonia means no more than a “ﬁtting together”18 of the 
various parts of the body. And this “ﬁtting together” itself has not been 
conceived adequately so far: harmonia has—as Socrates says—“been 
moderately gracious” (95a), only so, one should add for clariﬁcation. Had 
harmonia been more gracious the conception of the soul as a harmonia may 
have inspired a clearer view and avoided the possibility of dissonance 
with the activity of philosophy.
VI. Symphônein
Socrates’ refutation of Simmias’ metaphor conceives harmonia as a 
connection of physical elements (albeit with musical functions), yet this 
connection is not musical in essence. A musical conception of harmonia 
would need to shed further light on how connection is achieved and which 
particular musical features qualify it. In addition a musical conception 
of harmonia would have required a reference to its abstract foundation, 
especially given the fact that Simmias and Cebes are pupils of Philolaus, 
the Pythagorean. In Pythagorean thinking, harmonia is not just a matter of 
sounding concordance, but is reﬂected in a more profound, mathematical 
proportionality. It would seem that such an abstract proportionality 
would not be dependant on the concrete existence of any body, but merely 
on their ideal or possible existence. A fully musical characterisation 
in accordance with Pythagorean understanding of an equivalence of 
music and mathematics is not achieved in the metaphor in question or 
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in its subsequent refutation. What is achieved is an afﬁrmation of the 
requirement for a higher harmonia: that between the philosopher’s life 
and his death. The elements of this harmonia are—as we have repeatedly 
stated—the philosopher’s convictions, words and actions. 
A more specifically musical phenomenon (symphônia), or more 
precisely a further way of connecting that appears musically more 
convincing than Simmias’  harmonia metaphor is identified in the 
context of the engagement with Cebes’ objection and more concretely 
in Socrates’ account of a “second sailing”. This account follows a 
second silence and caesura in the text as Phaedo informs us that 
“Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought” (95e). 
Following this silence, Socrates explains how his intellectual method of 
inquiry actually progresses and how it substantiates itself in particular 
in relation to the investigation of cause (aitia): 
So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the 
truth of realities. Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do 
not grant in the least that he who studies realities by means of conceptions 
is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts 
of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some 
principle (logos) which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to 
agree (symphônein) with it whether relating to cause or anything else, I 
regard as true, and whatever disagrees (diaphonein) with it, as untrue. 
(100a)
With this methodological outlook Socrates approaches the question how 
particular, everyday being is constituted or how the absolute forms are 
related to appearances. He reiterates something he has always maintained, 
namely, that things are what they are on account of the “presence (parousia) 
or communion (koinonia) (call it which you please)” (100d5) of absolute 
Being in or with the world of everyday being or appearance. Socrates 
implies that this is “the safest answer” he can give (presumably safest 
in the context of the “second sailing”) and he playfully hypothesises 
that another identiﬁcation of cause which appeals for an explanation 
of everyday being or appearance to the constitution of appearance and 
everyday being itself would generate fear. Socrates admonishes Cebes 
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about remaining mindful that such explanations from appearances are 
in fact the root of this fear and suggests that he must continue to focus on 
the nature of the transcendent principle in question:
You would distrust your inexperience and would be afraid, as the saying 
goes, of your own shadow; so you would cling to that safe principle of 
ours and would reply as I said. And if anyone attacked that principle, you 
would pay him no attention and you would not reply to him until you had 
examined the consequences to see whether they agreed (symphônein) with 
one another or not (diaphonein); and when you had to give an explanation 
of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other 
principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until 
you reached one which was adequate. You would not mix things up, as 
disputants do, in talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you 
wished to discover any of the realities; for perhaps not one of them thinks 
or cares in the least about these things. They are so clever that they succeed 
in being well pleased with themselves even when they mix things up; but if 
you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I said. (101d3-102)
Socrates describes here the approach and context of explanation 
and refutation: When faced with many explanations and arguments, 
the sound way to remain in contact with truth is to establish how the 
consequences of explanations harmonize with each other in their totality. 
This musical understanding governs Socrates’ own positive conceptions 
(as seen in the ﬁrst passage dealing with hypothesis) and his approach 
to the refutation of the conceptions advanced by others. What is the 
character of such connections of explanations and arguments? It has been 
pointed out that the meaning of symphônein is potentially complex and 
moreover not completely consistent between the two passages cited19. 
These impressions become emphasised when we attempt to interpret 
symphônein in a purely logical or propositional context. However, the 
intention of the passage is directed beyond such a context.20 What 
is at stake in identifying whether something agrees (symphônein) or 
does not agree is the validation of the connection between reason and 
experience or perception as reﬂected in propositions. This validation 
cannot be effected if we withdraw to a purely logical or propositional 
analysis. Even a purely formal analysis of propositions about the world 
Silence as the greatest music:  The harmony of philosophy and Mousikê in Plato’s Phaedo
L&A 2009.1.indd   106 9/9/09   8:49:28 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 107 
of appearance contains judgments about the content of such propositions 
that affect their consequences but remain initially hidden from the view 
of propositional analysis. In fact an interpretation of the world and a 
quest for cause cannot rely on an analysis of propositional form alone 
or hope to sustain its insights in formal justiﬁcation. Symphônein is 
thus no mere formal agreement but one which includes the import and 
content of the propositions and hypotheses in question. To establish 
this type of agreement is inﬁnitely more difﬁcult than a purely formal 
analysis or an analysis which constantly confuses the “beginning 
and its consequences”21. What is required is a view that can perceive 
how propositions harmonize in their interpreted meaning. This is an 
interpretative challenge, a challenge that needs to perceive the sensible 
meaning of propositions in light of qualiﬁed perceptions of reality and 
contexts of experience. The Phaedo as a whole attempts to illustrate such 
an intellectual project in relation to the immortality of the soul. It exposes 
how thinking, articulation and reality actually harmonize (symphônein) 
and how the recognition of this symphônia sustains the existence of the 
philosopher. This agreement is musical in nature, for it is beyond the 
reach of a constructive, formal separation and it is in its proportionality 
inclusive of the whole which constitutes it. This accords with the way 
in which Pythagorean mathematical proportion articulates musical 
consonance while itself reﬂecting the entirety of the context in which this 
proportion is expressed: A Pythagorean harmonic proportion22 does not 
only disclose the nature of its parts (the division required to produce a 
given perfect interval) but also discloses the hidden totality that binds 
the proportion together (the string as a whole). 
VII. Silence as mousikê
We are now able to consider in which sense the silence of the Phaedo 
qualiﬁes as music and how it sustains a view of the dialogue as a musical 
work. As I have discussed above the Phaedo is marked by three silences: 
The ﬁrst silence follows Socrates’ threefold argument for the immortality 
of the soul and precedes his reference to the swan-song. The second silence 
precedes the description of the “second sailing” and follows a summary of 
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Cebes’ unease about the absence of a cogent argument for the immortality 
of the soul. The ﬁnal silence occurs at the very end of the dialogue and 
follows Socrates’ death itself. Admonishing his disciple to pay the debt 
of a cock to Asclepius, the God of healing, Socrates no longer responds 
to his friends and falls silent. 
What is the signiﬁcance of these three silences? One way to answer 
the question is to consider what precedes and follows each silence and 
how each silence binds dissonant sections or thoughts together. In other 
words, each silence can be conceived as a connection23 or as a harmonia. 
And indeed, each of the silences brings into harmony that which has been 
said with the yet-unsaid.
The first silence considers the philosopher’s relation to his own 
mortality in the light of a life of philosophy and in the face of incomplete 
proofs for the immortality of the soul. This dissonance, however, is 
harmonized in the metaphor of the swans. The human philosopher is 
no self-sufﬁcient being. He is a servant to the God Apollo and as such 
his incomplete knowledge of his own immortality is no issue of concern. 
His philosophical arguments do not prove the existence of immortality, 
but his philosophising commences with its assumption and concludes 
with its realisation. This activity itself, in which the body is experienced 
as a limitation and as a prison, is sufﬁcient to sustain the conﬁdence and 
joy that the philosopher shares with the swans at the prospect of being 
liberated.
The second silence also follows from a dissonance, namely the 
realisation that Cebes’ demand for “a proof that our soul is indestructible 
and immortal” (95c) has not yet been fulﬁlled and the fear that such a 
proof is required to sustain the conﬁdence which is essential to philosophy 
and the philosopher in the ongoing existence of the soul. This silence is 
followed by Socrates’ account of the “second sailing”, his own intellectual 
method which elaborates what a proof in relation to generation and 
decay can and should in effect look like. The silence binds together the 
account of the “second sailing” and the danger that an absent proof for 
the immortality of the soul will show the philosopher’s conﬁdence to be 
senseless and foolish. In response to the silence the philosopher shows 
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himself to be superior to the “contradiction-mongers” whose ignorance 
prevents them from seeing that they in fact “mix everything up” (102). 
The philosopher by contrast articulates a method of establishing the 
truthfulness of an inquiry. Even a hypothesis about the human soul and 
its immortality will need to substantiate itself according to this method 
of establishing agreement between new and existing conceptions. Until 
such an inquiry is completed, the existing balance favoring the strongest 
hypotheses must prevail and the cause for the soul being immortal must 
be identiﬁed in the presence or communion of absolute immortality.
The final silence is a harmonia that must bind together Socrates’ 
immediate attitude in the face of death and the interlocutors’ (and 
readers’) silent realisation that the logoi of the dialogue have not achieved 
by themselves any proof for immortality that had been expected. It is of 
course by far the most extensive and open-ended silence and it in fact 
constitutes the greatest music of the dialogue yet. It reaches beyond 
the dialogue to the reader. This silence binds the reader to the fate of 
Socrates and motivates her continued puzzlement and perplexity, her 
turn towards philosophy. Why does Socrates raise “the cup to his lips 
and very cheerfully and quietly” (117c) drain it given that proofs for the 
immortality of the soul are not conclusive? 
The final silence appears to be the end of the dialogue but what 
exactly comes to an end? A report on the death of Socrates, to be sure, 
but on the level of the reader’s consciousness, the silence is no end 
and the dialogue is continuing. The effect of the silence on the reader 
can be likened to the impact of music as it is identified by Hegel:
If we abstract from that which can be understood and we let our guard 
down, the musical work of art absorbs us and takes us with it, regardless 
of the power which art as art ordinarily has over us. The peculiar power 
of music is a primordial (elementarisch) power, that is, it rests with the 
element of tone, in which this art moves. The subject is moved by this 
element not only in this or that particularity nor is it caught by a particular 
content, but it is in its simple self, the center of his spiritual being, lifted 
into the work and moved into activity. 24
The power of the final silence of the philosopher is primordial 
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(elementarisch). It impacts on the entire sphere of the reader’s existence, 
it captures the reader as a whole in the same way as Hegel alleges the 
musical work captures the listener. This musical engagement effects a 
conversion in the audience and in the reader. In fact Socrates’ statement 
indicates that a puriﬁcation has been achieved, a healing of Socrates’ 
friends and by implication a healing of his engaged readers.25 This healing 
is the conversion to the life of philosophy. It follows directly from the 
silence of the dialogue and from Socrates’ practice of philosophy as the 
greatest music.
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Endnotes
1  Apology 38a: “And if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about 
which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that 
the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less.”
2  Ann Hartle has argued that Phaedo’s report is deceptive and that in fact Phaedo is not a 
disinterested spectator and conceals Socrates’ own fear of death (Hartle, 32-34).
3  This point is made by many commentators, notably Gadamer, 11.
4  Burger, 8. 
5  Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, 78.(in the following GdT)
6  Nietzsche, GdT, 81.
7  Nietzsche, GdT, 82.
8  Nietzsche, GdT, 95.
9  Bostock is an example of an exposition which seems entirely and exclusively interested in 
Plato’s arguments. He fails to discuss this reference to charms altogether. A more sophisticated 
attitude is found in Frede (Frede, 64), who draws attention to the ironic context and to 
the childish nature of the fear. Frede suggests that Socrates “defends himself against this 
ambivalent compliment”  to be the best charmer by referring to the presence of competent 
people among the Greeks and the barbarians. But Socrates also suggests that nothing should be 
spared to “search through all of them” and he also suggests that the interlocutors themselves 
are in an even better positions to become such charmers and alleviate their own fears. In my 
view Frede’s point indicates the context of a productive interpretation by bringing intentions 
and outcomes of the three arguments which are coming to a stop here into view.  She writes: “A 
proof in the narrow sense is not in Plato’s intention, as the emphasis of the mere relationship 
between the changeless and the intelligible shows. Socrates is far from suggesting that the 
soul is ‘almost’ an idea and therefore eternal and immortal. Plato is rather intending to 
emphasise the relationship between the soul with the things that enable the best possible life, 
that is to emphasise the understanding of the ontological dichotomy between sensuality and 
intelligibility and to emphasise the necessity to concentrate on the latter” (73, my translation) 
and later: “With these considerations Plato has in the ﬁrst instance illuminated conditions and 
has made clear that the question, if death is the end of all things, depends on the nature of 
the soul. These three proofs also show progress insofar as it becomes clear that it is not mere 
life, but the good life which is the basis for the question of immortality” (76, my translation). 
Broecker refers to a certainty (Gewissheit) that is required in order to sustain Platonic 
philosophy. In his discussion of this point in the text, Broecker notes—as other commentators 
have—that “the proof does not succeed and even Plato himself seems aware of this fact. It is 
an attempt, but even if it failed, Plato maintains that it was on the right track and it does not 
follow that the attempt was not taken seriously, but that one must repeat it and continue on 
this path until one reaches the aim. Somehow, Plato thinks, it must be possible to build a bridge 
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from the certainty about the existence of the forms to the certainty of the immortality of the 
soul.” (Broecker, 183, my translation). While this seems correct, the question remains what this 
certainty is and how it is grounded. As I try to show in this paper the certainty sought may well 
be a musical - not a propositional certainty. The propositional, argumentative certainty is never 
convincingly attained in the dialogue. Does this mean, that attempts to pursue it are useless? 
Clearly not as Socrates points out in the discussion about misologia since failure of an argument 
may indicate two things: the failure of the argument alone or an insufﬁcient condition of those 
who conceive it. Philosophy as it is outlined in the Phaedo is primarily concerned with the latter 
and thus arguments (Broecker is right in this) need to be repeated.
10  See also Brann, 18
11  See Hartle, 20 who argues that “the arguments for the immortality of the soul are not very 
good arguments, and, since Socrates himself refutes them within the dialogue, we can infer that 
Socrates is aware of their weakness.”
12  Reale (1996), 67 points to a musical analogy in his discussion of the formal separation of the 
ﬁrst and second part of the dialogue: “The themes under consideration occupy almost half of 
the work, however, they are followed by a spiraling repetition, be it on the level of argument, 
be it on the level of mythical representation and ethical reﬂection. Plato separates the ﬁrst from 
the second part with a magniﬁcient intermezzo (84c-91d) which one can read and appreciate 
like an intermezzo of a great musical work. It is constituted by four phases, two poetic ones and 
two conceptual ones: the metaphor of the most beautiful song of the swans before their death, 
symbol for the last word of Socrates about the immortality of the soul before his death (84c-85d), 
the theoretical doubt by Simmias and Cebes (85e-88b); the metaphor of the cutting of Phado’s 
hair as a sign of grief should the repetition of the argument miss its aim (88c-89c); ﬁnally the 
encouragement by Socrates to trust reason, to avoid rejection of reason and skepticism while 
understanding perfectly well that one must be able to justify the limits of one’s possibilities (89c-
91c).”
13  Hesiod, Theogony, 24-30.
14  Nietzsche, Human-All-too-Human, Book I. Aphorism 483.
15  Aristotle,  de Anima 407 b31, see also Gottschalk, 182.
16  Symposium, 187b 4.
17  Republic, 398-400.
18  Heidegger’s discussion of harmonia in the context of Heraclitean fragments is relevant here: “Alas, 
the essential aspect of harmonia is not its relationship with sound and tone but the armos, the 
connection (Fuge), that through which one ﬁts into the other, when both ﬁts into the connection so 
that there is a connection” (Heidegger, 141, my translation).
19  See particularly Gentzler, 266, Bostock, 169 and Bailey, 96-97 who discusses the use of this word in 
Plato’s Cratylus, 436 d1 ff. 
20  Bostock, 170 makes this clear when he states: “Indeed if we use the word ‘consequence’ strictly, 
to mean what follows by logic alone, then most hypotheses—taken just by themselves—have 
no interesting consequences at all. What we normally have in mind when we speak of the 
consequences of a hypothesis are not strictly consequences of that hypothesis by itself, but 
consequences which follow from it together with other things that we believe anyway.”
21  Bostock’s translation of this sentence seems clearer than Fowler: “You wouldn’t jumble things as 
the contradiction-mongers do, by discussing the starting-point and its consequences at the same 
time, if, that is, you wanted to discover anything” (Bostock, 167).
22  Pythagoras’ experiments with a monochord are said to have resulted in the discovery of the 
relationship between perfect intervals and proportions of string-lengths as articulated by simple 
numerical proportions, ie. Octave 1:2; Fifth 2:3, Fourth 3:4, etc. 
23  A Heideggerian “Fuge” or jointure.
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24  Hegel, 154/55.
25  Madison makes the point that Socrates’ statement refers to the ﬁrst person plural (“we owe a 
cock”) (Madison, 430) indicating that Socrates is not referring to his own healing and is thus 
not—contrary to Nietzsche’s interpretation in Aphorism 340 of the Gay Science—denigrating 
our physical existence. In fact the “we” refers to Socrates and his friends and acknowledges that 
a collective healing or conversion has been achieved. It continues to refer to the second person 
singular (“pay the debt and don’t be careless.”). The latter part of the statement in fact refers 
to an individual (Crito or anyone else) and admonishes this person not to be careless with his 
own life, but to pursue the life of philosophy. For Madison this “ last phrase is the anthem of 
Socrates’ philosophical mission, the best advice he had to give, indeed the fruit of his wisdom: 
Do not be careless with your life, purify yourselves and give thanks to the god of healing for his 
assistance in your conversion” (Madison, 435).
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